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Abstract: This paper surveys empirical research that shows that small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) are more constrained by financing and other institutional obstacles 
than large enterprises, exacerbated by the weaknesses in the financial systems of many 
developing countries.  We use the concept of the access possibilities frontier to explain 
how difficulties in managing risk and transaction costs involved in SME lending makes 
financial institutions and markets so reluctant to reach out to this group of enterprises, 
especially in developing countries. We discuss different policies and reforms that can 
entice financial institutions and markets to lend to SMEs and comment on the role of the 
government in institution building, providing the regulatory framework and undertake 
market-friendly activist policies.  However, we also point to pitfalls in government's 
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1. Introduction 
  Small and medium enterprises account for a large share of enterprises and a large 
share of overall employment in the private sector of most economies.  Employment in 
enterprises with up to 250 employees constitutes over 60% of total employment in 
manufacturing in many countries (Figure 1), which justifies the statement that “SMEs are 
the emerging private sector in poor countries and thus form the base for private sector-led 
growth” (Hallberg, 2001).  Cross-country evidence, however, also shows that small and 
medium enterprises are more constrained in their operation and growth than large 
enterprises and access to financial services features importantly among the constraints 
(Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006).   
This paper summarizes recent empirical evidence on SMEs’ financing constraints 
and patterns. While offering broad cross-country comparisons, it should be noted that this 
paper focuses mainly on developing and emerging markets.  It offers a conceptual 
framework to understand why financial institutions in most countries are so reluctant to 
reach out to these enterprises and discusses different policies and reform that can increase 
SMEs’ access to external finance.  Based on this framework, the paper goes on to discuss 
government’s role in enhancing access to finance, ranging from institution building over 
providing regulatory frameworks to market-friendly activist policies, while at the same 
time noting potential pitfalls in governments’ attempts to enhance SMEs’ access to credit.   
Policy efforts targeted at SMEs have often been justified with arguments that (i) 
SMEs are an engine of innovation and growth, (ii) they help reduce poverty as they are 
more labor-intensive, but (iii) they are constrained by institutional and market failures.
1  
While country-level and micro-economic studies have not provided conclusive evidence 
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on these arguments, recent cross-country evidence does not support the claim that 
countries with a larger share of SMEs in the manufacturing sector grow faster or see their 
poverty rates fall faster (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2005). Specifically, there 
does not seem to be any robust relationship between the share of small, medium or large 
enterprises and economic development. On the other hand, cross-country research has 
pointed to the institutional and business environment in which enterprises operate as an 
important factor for economic development.  The business environment includes – among 
other elements - well-defined property rights, both between private parties and protection 
against government expropriation, effective contract enforcement, competitive product, 
labor and capital makers, and a legal framework that allows for relatively easy entry and 
exit of enterprises. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) show how different elements of the 
business environment affect economic growth through the entry of new firms. 
Specifically, high firm registration costs hamper new firm creation and growth, while 
property right protection and regulations fostering access to finance are conducive to firm 
creation and growth. The effect of policies might also explain the absence of a robust 
relationship between the size of the SME sector and growth, as a comparison between 
Italy and the UK illustrates.  On the one hand, Italy has high registration costs and many 
old, inefficient and slow growing SMEs, while the UK with low entry barriers has firms 
that enter at a lower scale than in Italy but grow more rapidly (Figure 2).  
Taking together, this implies the policy focus shifting away from size-oriented 
policies towards policies that level the playing field between firms of different sizes and 
allow for entry of new enterprises.  While small firms suffer more from financing and 
other constraints than large firms, it is not size itself that justifies intervention, but rather  3  
the potential of small firms to grow into medium and large enterprises and to contribute 
to the economy and the fact that institutional and market failures create an uneven 
playing field between firms of different sizes. As we will argue below, the focus should 
therefore be both on reforms of the business environment that affect all enterprises and 
foster entrepreneurship (Klapper and Quesada-Delgado, 2007), but also on policies that 
can help SMEs overcome financing constraints particular to their firm size and risk. The 
focus should be less on subsidies to small enterprises per se. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 summarizes recent 
empirical evidence on SMEs’ financing constraints and patterns.  Section 3 offers a 
conceptual framework to understand why financial institutions are reluctant to reach out 
to SMEs.  Section 4 uses this framework to discuss policies to overcome these constraints 
and section 5 discusses in detail government’s role.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. SMEs’ financing constraints – the evidence
2 
Access to and cost of finance is often ranked as one of most constraining feature 
of the business environment by SMEs (Figure 3).  Specifically, the cost of finance is 
rated by over 35% of small and medium enterprises as major growth constraint in a 
sample of 71, mostly developing, countries, more than any other characteristic of the 
business environment, including tax rates and macroeconomic instability, also rated by 
many SMEs as major growth constraints.  Access to finance is rated as major constraint 
by around 30% of small and medium enterprises, a similar proportion as economic policy 
uncertainty and corruption.  Further, financing is one of the few characteristics of the 
business environment that – together with crime and political instability - is robustly 
                                                 
2 This section builds on Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006).   4  
linked to firm growth, while other features have at most an indirect effect on firm growth 
(Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006). 
Small firms consistently report higher financing obstacles than medium and large 
enterprises (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic, 2006). Smaller, younger 
and domestic- (as opposed to foreign-owned) enterprises report higher financing 
obstacles even after controlling for other firm characteristics.  The relationship is not only 
statistically but also economically significant.  The probability that a small firm lists 
financing as a major obstacle (as opposed to moderate, minor or no obstacle) is 39% 
compared to 36% for medium-size firms and 32% for large firms. 
The higher financing obstacles reported by small as compared to large firms are 
also reflected in financing patterns (Figure 4).  While small firms finance less than ten 
percent of their investment needs with bank finance, large firms finance more than 20% 
with bank credit.  Large firms have a similar, through not as strong, advantage, in trade 
credit and development finance, while small firms seem to finance a larger of investment 
with equity and informal finance, compared to large firms. Small firms also finance a 
significantly larger share of their new investment with internal resources than large firms.  
Further, small firms are less likely to use bank finance and other sources of external 
finance (Figure 5).  While 30% of large firms use bank finance to finance new 
investment, only 12% of small firms do.  
Small firms do not only report higher financing obstacles, they are also more 
adversely affected by these obstacles. As shown in Figure 6, small firms’ financing 
obstacles have almost twice the effect on their growth that large firms’ financing 
obstacles do (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005). The difference between  5  
small and large firms is at least as big or even bigger for some of the specific financing 
obstacles, such as collateral requirements, bank paperwork, interest rate payments, the 
need for special connections and banks’ lack of lending resources. Also the lack of access 
to specific forms of financing such as export, leasing and long-term finance is 
significantly more constraining for small firms’ growth than for large firms’ growth.    
Quasi-natural experimental evidence confirms the importance of credit constraints 
for firm growth. Banerjee and Duflo (2004) analyze detailed loan information on 253 
Indian SMEs’ before and after they became eligible for a directed subsidized lending 
program and find that the additional credit resulted in a proportional increase in sales 
rather than a substitution for other non-subsidized credit, indicating that these firms were 
credit constrained before receiving subsidized credit. Similarly, Zia (2007) finds that 
small non-listed and non-group firms in Pakistan reduce their sales after they become 
ineligible for subsidized export credit, indicating the existence of credit constraints; in 
contrast, large, listed and group firms do not reduce their sales after losing access to 
subsidized credit.  It should be stressed that this evidence does not support subsidized 
credit as a means to alleviate small firms’ credit constraints – a topic to which we will 
return below -, but they show that small firms are constrained by their lack of access to 
external finance. 
Recent research also shows the importance of the business environment for firms’ 
financing constraints and patterns. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic 
(2006) show that institutional development, measured very broadly, is the most robust 
country-characteristic predicting cross-country variation in firms’ financing obstacles, 
even after controlling for cross-country differences in GDP per capita. Firms in countries  6  
with higher levels of institutional development report significantly lower financing 
obstacles than firms in countries with less developed institutions. The positive effect of 
financial and institutional development can also be observed in the use of external 
finance. Better protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms 
significantly more than it does for large firms, particularly due to the differential impact it 
has on bank and supplier finance (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004b). 
Financial and institutional development helps create a level playing field between 
small and large firms, while the lack of an effective financial system explains the 
phenomenon of the missing middle observed in many developing countries.  Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) show that the effect of growth obstacles on firm 
growth is smaller in countries with better-developed financial and legal systems.  The 
effect of financial and legal development on the constraints-growth relationship is 
significantly stronger for small firms than for large firms.   Financial and institutional 
development thus helps close the gap between small and large firms. This is also 
confirmed by more detailed country comparisons.  For example, Sleuwaegen and 
Goedhuys (2002) show that smaller firms grow relatively faster in Germany than in Côte 
d’Ivoire, while the opposite holds for large firms.  Using cross-industry, cross-country 
data for 44 countries and 36 industries in the manufacturing sector, Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2005) show that financial development exerts a 
disproportionately large positive effect on the growth of industries that are naturally 
composed of more small firms. Their results suggest that the furniture industry (an 
industry with many small firms) should grow 1.4% per annum faster than the spinning 
industry (an industry with relatively few small firms) in Canada (a country with a well  7  
developed financial system) than in India (which has a low level of financial 
development).  Since the average industry growth rate in their sample is 3.4%, this is a 
relatively large effect.  This suggests that financial market development helps small firms 
more than large firms overcome financial market frictions thus leading to a more level 
playing field between firms of different sizes.  
The constraining effect of financial and institutional underdevelopment also 
shows up in a distorted size distribution. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999) find that the 
average size of firms in human capital-intensive and R&D intensive industries is larger in 
countries with better property rights and patent protection. Similarly, Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2006) show in a cross country sample that large firms, i.e. firms 
that are most likely to be able to choose the boundaries of the firm, are larger in countries 
with better-developed financial and legal systems.  Finally, Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta 
(2007) find for a sample of European countries that financial development enhances new 
firm entry in sectors that depend more heavily on external finance and that the smallest 
size firms benefit the most in terms of higher entry from higher financial development.  
They also show that financial development promotes the post-entry growth of firms in 
sectors that depend more on external finance. These results suggest that agency problems 
between outside investors and corporate insiders keep firms smaller in countries with 
weak legal and financial systems. Firms thus stay smaller in countries with 
underdeveloped financial and legal systems.  On the other hand, access to financial 
services can help new entrepreneurs survive beyond the first year, as evidence from 
Bosnia shows (Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Panos, 2007) and can help enterprises 
innovate at a faster rate (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2007)   8  
3. SMEs’ financing constraints – a conceptual framework
3 
The empirical evidence that financing constraints and access to external finance 
are inversely correlated with firm size matches theoretical models that use fixed 
transaction costs and information asymmetries and the resulting agency problems as basis 
for financial market frictions (see Levine, 2005 for an overview).  In the following, we 
will build on this theoretical literature and the empirical evidence to derive a conceptual 
framework explaining SMEs’ financing constraints and thus set the basis for the policy 
discussion of the next section. 
Transaction costs and information asymmetries drive the variation in access to 
finance across firms of different sizes.  Take first transaction costs.  Fixed transaction 
costs in credit assessment, processing and monitoring result in decreasing unit costs as 
the size of the loan increases. These fixed transaction costs exist at the transaction, client, 
institution and even financial system level.  Assessing an individual loan request entails 
costs that are at least partially independent of the loan amount. Maintaining a client 
relationship over time and across different financial products, including loan, deposit and 
savings services, implies costs that are partly orthogonal to the number and amount of 
financial transactions with the client.  At the level of the financial institution, fixed costs 
range from brick-and-mortar branch installations over computer system to legal services 
and are again partly independent of the number of clients or the size of their loans. Fixed 
costs might even arise on the financial system level in the form of regulatory costs and 
the costs of payment and settlement systems, which are up to a point independent of the 
number of transactions, clients and institutions in the system.  
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These fixed transaction costs drive a wedge between funding costs of financial 
institutions and the lending rate they charge borrowers.  In a world of uncertain returns on 
investments, higher transaction costs and the resulting higher lending costs can increase 
the likelihood that borrowers cannot pay due to too high of a repayment burden.  Rather 
than increasing the interest rate to the market clearing rate, financial institutions might 
ration at a lower interest rate than the market equilibrium rate because higher interest 
rates would lead to lower expected repayments (Williamson, 1987).  High transaction 
costs do therefore not only increase the cost of borrowing, but can also restrict access to 
external finance for some borrower groups.  
While transaction costs are restraining for all borrowers, there are arguments that 
they are even more constraining for small and medium enterprises.  Their diverse 
characteristics and their relative opaqueness increases assessment and monitoring costs. 
Unlike other credit categories, such as consumer credit or mortgage lending, SME 
lending is still considered a high-cost lending product.  More specifically, unlike other 
lending products that can be reduced to simple transactions, SME lending often still 
depends heavily on relationships between borrowers and lenders (Berger and Udell, 
1998, 2006). 
In addition to transaction costs, the outreach to small and medium enterprises is 
constrained by default risk. Default risk can be either borrower-specific or systemic.  In 
the following, we will focus on the borrower-specific risk and more specifically on risks 
arising from asymmetric information between borrower and lenders.   If the debtor is 
privy to information about her project or her effort and the lender may only secure this 
information at a prohibitively high cost, this can lead to two different sources of risk:  10 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  Adverse selection refers to difficulties of choosing 
good credit risks ex-ante, while moral hazard refers to the inability of the lender of 
effectively enforcing the agreed credit contract ex-post.   Although such risk can be 
compensated by increasing the interest rate, this would increase adverse selection and 
moral hazard. As the interest rate rises, this will attract riskier borrowers to the pool and 
will entice borrowers to undertake riskier project with a higher probability of default.   
The impossibility to use interest rates as screening technology entices lenders to use non-
interest screening devices such as collateral, warrants or assessment based on audited 
information. In its ultimate consequence, however, lenders will ration credit rather than 
allow the interest rate to rise to the market-clearing level, as first shown by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). 
  To illustrate the non-linear relationship between interest rates and credit supply 
due to transaction costs and agency problems, Figure 7 plots the nominal interest rate i 
and the return for the lender r.  In a world with costs and risks, the two would be identical 
as illustrated by the 45% line. In a world of transaction costs and agency problems, 
however, there is an increasing wedge between nominal interest rate and return.  As i 
increases, there is a higher default probability and the return to the lender therefore 
increases at a decreasing rate.    Similarly, as i increases, the borrower pool becomes 
riskier, which again results in a higher default probability.  Eventually, the marginal 
benefit of an interest rate increase due to higher revenues is equal to the marginal costs 
due to higher default and at higher nominal interest rates, the return to the lender 
decreases.    11 
As in the case of transaction costs, SME lending is more affected by the inability 
to manage risks than other lending products.  Compared to large firms, SMEs are 
commonly more opaque, less likely to be able to post collateral and often do not have 
audited financial statements that allow a better picture of the enterprise and its projected 
profits.  These features of the SME lending market make the curve in Figure 7 flatter and 
the flexion point lower than in other lending markets. 
Lenders must develop loan technologies that enable them to choose such SMEs 
that, for any given lending interest rate, will yield the highest risk-adjusted expected net 
return.    To select such debtors, the creditor must compare: (i) the all-in costs of lending 
to different debtors/projects; (ii) the differences in expected returns (capacity to pay) 
across such debtors/projects that the lender considers to be equally risky; and (iii) the 
differences in risks and willingness to pay across such debtors/projects that the lender 
considers to be of equal expected returns (or capacity to pay).  The scope for optimization 
that the lender will have in managing lending costs and risks will be constrained by state 
variables, such as the contractual and informational frameworks, macroeconomic 
environment, technology and other characteristics of the business environment in which 
both lender and borrower operate, such as physical infrastructure, crime and political 
instability.  These state variables are not only outside the reach of lenders’ actions, but 
neither can they be changed in the short-run by policy makers.   The weaker these state 
variables, the flatter the curve in Figure 7 and the less the maneuvering room for credit 
supply optimization.  Given the constraints, a prudent lender will rather not offer loans at 
a higher interest rate if she is not reasonably sure of her ability to appropriately measure 
costs, sort out risks for a given expected return, and identify expected returns for a given  12 
risk.  However, there is also the possibility that lenders will not maximize their lending 
opportunities to SMEs given by the state variables.  On the other extreme, lenders might 
act imprudently and lend more to SMEs than sustainable under the current state variables.  
Using the concept of state variables allows us to define the Access Possibilities 
Frontier for SME lending as a rationed equilibrium, i.e. the maximum share of viable 
loan applicants that could be served by financial institutions prudently given the existing 
state variables.
4 To derive the frontier and thus the bankable share of loan applicants, we 
have to take into account both demand and supply side factors, while holding the state 
variables constant. The demand for loanable funds is a positive function of expected 
returns on investible projects and a negative function of the lending interest rate and 
voluntary self-exclusion.  By enabling debtors to seek resources for risky projects that 
they would not undertake with their own money, the option to borrow gives rise to the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard discussed above, which can result in an 
imprudently high loan demand.  While the loan supply is thus a positive function of the 
nominal lending interest rate, this relationship is non-linear and might turn negative 
beyond a threshold. Lenders will thus not satisfy all the loan demand but rather ration it 
at an interest rate below the market-clearing rate. This is an inevitable cost of prudence in 
a world of uncertainty and agency problems—some “good” debtors have to be left out in 
order to minimize the set of “bad” debtors that are let in. In statistical terms, this is the 
trade-off between type I and type II errors.  
The Access Possibilities Frontier, however, is not time-invariant, as the example 
of technology shows.  The increasing use of IT in lending reduces processing costs and 
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thus overall transaction costs related to lending, but can also improve risk management, 
through the introduction of credit scoring (Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005; Frame, Padhi 
and Woosley, 2004; Frame, Srinivasan and Woosley, 2001). 
Given costs and risks and demand-side constraints, we can use the Access 
Possibilities Frontier to identify several types of access to credit problems. A first type of 
access problem is demand-originated and consists in too low a number of loan applicants 
simply because of self-exclusion resulting from cultural barriers or financial illiteracy.  
Alternatively, there could be a lack of profitable investment projects in the economy that 
deserve financing based on their expected return.
 A second type of access problem can 
arise due to supply sub-optimization that leads to credit markets settling at a point below 
the Access Possibilities Frontier.  This can reflect, for instance, regulatory distortions or 
insufficient contestability that cause lenders not to fully exploit all the outreach 
opportunities, given the state variables.  A third and very different access problem is 
associated with “excess access,” that is, an equilibrium above the Access Possibilities 
Frontier with loans being granted to a larger share of loan applicants than is prudently 
warranted, given the lending interest rate and the state variables. A final access problem 
consists of too low a prudent Access Possibilities Frontier due to deficiencies in state 
variables compared to countries with similar levels of economic development.     
Each of these access problems calls for different policies.  The first type of 
problems calls for demand-side measures that educate and encourage the healthy use of 
financial products by SMEs.  A problem of profitable investment projects, on the other 
hand, has to be addressed through non-financial sector policies and is primarily not a 
problem of access to finance.  The second problem calls for interventions and policies  14 
that encourage financial institutions to maximize outreach to SMEs given the contractual 
and macroeconomic environment, while the third problem calls for restraining measures.  
The final set of policies are general reforms of the business environment and institutional 
framework that are not specific to the SME lending market.  We will discuss these 
different policies in the next section. 
 
4. SMEs’ financing constraints – policies 
The Access Possibilities Frontier derived in the previous section allows us to 
discuss different policies to alleviate SMEs’ financing constraints.  Specifically, we will 
distinguish between market-developing policies that will help push out the frontier, 
market-enabling policies that push incumbent and new financial institutions towards the 
existing frontier and market-harnessing policies that prevent the financial system to move 
beyond the frontier towards a point of financial fragility.  Let us discuss each in turn. 
Market developing policies aim at improving the state variables and include 
reforms in the contractual and informational frameworks and macroeconomic 
performance.  As discussed above, while these reforms are not specific to the SME 
lending market, they will help level the playing field between small and large enterprises. 
The results of such reforms can take a long-time; nevertheless they are indispensable in 
order for the financial system to reach a higher sustainable equilibrium and be able to 
provide SMEs with the necessary financial services in a commercially viable manner.  
High lending interest rates may reflect doubts about fiscal solvency and a history 
of asset confiscation or inflation volatility, and will be often associated with crowding out 
of private investment due to the absorption by the government of a large share of  15 
society’s financial savings. This crowding out will especially hurt small and medium 
enterprises that unlike large and multinational enterprises do not have recourse to 
alternative finance providers.  Under such circumstances, the appropriate policies to 
foster access to credit would be those that aim at enhancing the resiliency of fiscal 
solvency and at establishing a credible record of low and stable inflation.  
A shallow credit market with low access may also result from major shortfalls in 
the contractual and informational frameworks (Beck and Levine, 2005).  The appropriate 
policies in this case would span a wide range: from titling of land property to the 
upgrading of laws affecting collateral repossession or execution of guarantees; from the 
modernization of corporate reorganization and bankruptcy proceedings to improvements 
in the functioning of the judiciary; from raising accounting and disclosure standards to 
establishing the appropriate legal framework and right incentives for the development of 
credit registries.   
Changes in the state variables involve changes in fundamental institutions and can 
take a long time to materialize.   To the extent that a financial system is operating below 
the possibilities frontier, there is room for market-enabling policies that may foster the 
broadening of access even in the absence of perceptible changes in state variables. Where 
the lack of profitable, credit-deserving investment projects is the main problem, non-
financial sector policies are called for.  Where the main reason for being below the 
possibilities frontier is the demand problem of self-exclusion, the appropriate policies 
would emphasize raising financial literacy.  If – as is more likely - the main problems 
reside with sub-optimization in credit supply, by contrast, a wider range of policy options 
can be considered, starting with competition policy.  16 
While theory and some empirical work suggest that market power might entice 
banks to invest in long-term relationships with small and opaque enterprises as they know 
that they can regain the initial investment in the relationship at a later stage (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004), other empirical papers point to 
the healthy effect of competition on availability of lending to SMEs (Cetorelli and 
Strahan, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004a).
5  Complicating the 
debate is that market structure, as for example measured by concentration ratios, is not 
the same as competitiveness, which is also influenced by the segmentation and 
contestability of a market (Claessens and Laeven, 2004).   Further, state variables such as 
the contractual and informational frameworks can influence the competitiveness of a 
financial system through the ability to transfer collateral easily from one lender to another 
and the ability of SMEs to build up reputation capital through a credit registry.  
There is mixed evidence concerning the effect of foreign bank entry on SME 
lending.  On the one hand, firm-survey evidence suggests that firms report lower 
financing obstacles in countries with a higher share of foreign banks, a finding that holds 
across different size groups of firms.  (Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria, 2006).  This 
positive effect can be a direct or an indirect one.  Foreign banks can bring the necessary 
know-how and scale to introduce new transaction lending techniques. By competing with 
domestic banks for large corporate clients, they can also force domestic banks to go down 
market to cater to SMEs (de Haas and Naaborg, 2005). On the other hand, bank-level 
information from specific countries suggests that foreign banks are less likely to lend to 
small and opaque companies than domestic banks (Mian, 2006; Gormley, 2006). So, any 
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positive effect of foreign bank entry on SME lending seems to be more indirect than 
direct.  
Regulatory policies can be important to push the system towards the frontier of 
SME lending.  Regulatory frameworks that enable leasing and factoring – traditional 
SME lending products – have featured prominently on the agenda.  Leasing is an 
attractive financing tool for SMEs as it is based on the cash flow of the financed asset, 
such as machinery or vehicle, rather than reputation of the enterprise or the asset base of 
the enterprise, it often includes tax advantages, and it allows for easier recovery if the 
correct legal framework is in place.  Factoring, the discounting of sales receivables, is 
attractive for small suppliers of large credit-worthy buyers, as it does not rely on 
information about the “borrower”, but rather on the obligor (Klapper, 2006).  Both 
leasing and factoring rely on a legal framework governing these transactions, but rely to a 
lesser extent on the contractual framework of a country, so that they can be help push a 
financial system towards the frontier of SME lending, even if this frontier is low.  Both 
transaction forms can also benefit a lot from electronic registration systems and electronic 
security laws, which will allow electronic processing and therefore reduction of 
transaction costs (Klapper, 2006, 2007).  
Loan classification and provisioning rules can also affect SMEs’ access to 
finance, through reliance less on collateral than on forward-looking assessment of 
payment performance.  Further, Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe (2006) show that SME 
lending might require more provisioning but less capital, given that the distribution of 
losses from small loans is less skewed than that for large loans.  Another regulatory issue  18 
is the equal taxation of financial products that are offered by different financial 
institutions, thus creating a competitive even playing field.  
A third group of policies, which we define as market-harnessing, try to prevent 
the financial system from moving to an unsustainable equilibrium beyond the frontier due 
to imprudent lending.  Such imprudent lending binges can arise from the same 
competition that market-enabling policies try to foster if not accompanied by a proper 
defined regulatory and supervisory framework.  Indiscriminate free entry for new 
deposit-taking credit institutions or the intensification of competition among incumbent 
institutions can lead to widespread fragility, especially in the context of implicit or 
explicit government guarantees, poor accounting and disclosure practices, deficient early 
warning system and prompt corrective action regimes, and dysfunctional failure 
resolution frameworks.  Market-harnessing policies therefore aim at keeping banks’ 
incentives to take aggressive risks in check through a mix of measures aimed at 
strengthening market and supervisory discipline.  The absence of too generous deposit 
insurance – implicit or explicit – and disclosure and transparency requirements give large 
creditors and depositors incentives and possibilities to monitor and discipline banks. In 
addition, market signals in the form of deposit interest rates, yields on subordinated debt 
or equity prices of publicly listed banks moving in response to risk taking and 
performance of banks provide additional information to bank supervisors and should be 
coupled with effective official intervention into institutions that the market has identified 
as weak.  Summarizing, policy makers have to strike a fine balance between market-
enabling policies that push financial institution towards the frontier and market- 19 
harnessing policies that prevent them from moving beyond the frontier, with the balance 
varying from country to country.  
 
5. SMEs’ financing constraints – the role of government 
  The different policies discussed in the previous section seem to call for an 
important role of the government in the “SME-Access to Finance” debate.  But what 
exactly government’s role is, is still subject to discussion.  While research has been able 
to identify which government interventions have not worked over the past decades in the 
SME lending market, researchers are still struggling to define exactly, which policies can 
work under which circumstances.  There is a trade-off between market failures and 
government failures, the tendency to remedy market failures through government 
interventions, which then in turn can lead to government failures.  In the following we 
will discuss different areas of government intervention, but would like to emphasize that 
this is an area still being researched, with no standard answers for all countries and 
markets and no pre-designed policy packages ready to be taken off the shelf.  What works 
in one country, might not work in others; a context-sensitive approach that takes into 
account country circumstances, is therefore called for (Honohan and Beck, 2007).  Where 
government intervention is involved, the strength of governance arrangements might be 
an important factor to be taken into account.  
Least controversial is the role of government in providing the contractual and 
informational framework and ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment.  
Government is the natural provider of key institutions such as legislation and court 
systems.  Similarly, given the government’s monopoly over the issue of monetary  20 
instruments, ensuring macroeconomic stability is a natural government task.  As 
discussed above, it is through these policies that the government can help push outwards 
the Access Possibilities Frontier and ensure a long-term sustainable increase in SMEs’ 
access to finance.  While these business environment reforms do not focus specifically on 
SMEs, they help close the gap between firms of different sizes and level the playing field. 
Through these policies the government helps develop markets that can then be used by 
financial institutions to reach out to SMEs.   
However, these markets are not always used and the financial system is likely to 
settle at an equilibrium below the frontier, which raises the question on government’s 
involvement in ensuring that the system moves towards the frontier.  We already 
discussed market-enabling policies, such as providing regulatory frameworks for leasing 
and factoring and fostering competition.  Some of these policies might require more 
active government involvement.  Improving the informational framework through the 
introduction of a credit information bureau is a specific area where government might 
have to step in.  While banks might be interested in establishing systems to share negative 
information, incumbent financial institutions might be less interested in sharing positive 
information.  On the other hand, positive information sharing allows SMEs to build up 
reputation collateral and thus fosters competition.  Overcoming banks’ opposition to 
share positive information can enhance the contestability of a financial system and might 
be an area where governments have to take a pro-active role.   
Beyond targeting competition per se, governments can also try produce a 
movement towards the possibilities frontier by addressing hindrances such as 
coordination failures, first mover disincentives, and obstacles to risk distribution and  21 
sharing. While not easy to define in general terms, given their variety, these government 
interventions tend to share a common feature in creating incentives for private lenders 
and investors to step in, without unduly shifting risks and costs to the government (de la 
Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler, 2006).  Three examples illustrate this approach.  One is the 
creation by NAFIN (a Mexican development bank) of an internet-based market, which 
allows small suppliers to use their receivable from large credit-worthy buyers to receive 
working capital financing (Klapper, 2006).  Another example is the Chilean program 
(FOGAPE) to promote lending to SMEs via the auctioning of partial government 
guarantees (Benavente, Galetovic, and Sanhueza, 2006).  Finally, the Mexican 
development fund FIRA has brokered a variety of structured finance packages to finance 
agricultural production (e.g., shrimp, corn) to realign credit risks with the pattern of 
information between financial institutions and different participants in the supply chains 
of these agricultural products (de la Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler, 2006).   While 
intriguing examples, it is not for sure whether risk is really not being shifted to 
government and taxpayers through such interventions and whether these interventions 
have sunset clauses that will allow the government to withdraw once its engagement is 
not needed anymore.  There are also governance concerns stemming from a government 
intervention in a private market.  Finally, from political economy viewpoint, such 
schemes might take away the pressure to implement the long-term institution building 
that is necessary to push out the frontier and expand SME lending sustainably in the long-
term.    22 
  Partial credit guarantee (PCG) schemes feature prominently among market-
activist policies.
6   While they also exist on a private basis, governments and donors have 
been aggressively pushing for their establishment to overcome the limited access to bank 
credit SMEs face.  By providing a guarantee, such as scheme can help overcome the lack 
of collateral of most SMEs, but issues of appropriate pricing, funding and the institutional 
structure are important.  While such schemes could be run on a self-sustainable basis, 
they often involve significant subsidies and contingent fiscal liabilities to cover losses.   
While it is difficult to compute such costs ex-ante, it is even more difficult to measure the 
benefits, which would be partially captured by additionality, i.e. the share of borrowers 
that would not have gained access to finance if it were not for the PCG.   An even more 
accurate measure would be the extent to which borrowers that would have gotten access 
to credit in a world without market frictions, could access the credit market due to PGCs, 
minus the extent to which borrowers gained access through the PCG that would not have 
gotten access in a friction-free world.   Ultimately, the cost of any government 
intervention has to take into account the return on each dollar of taxpayer’s money in 
such an intervention compared to other interventions, including interventions outside the 
financial sector.  
While the government often does not intervene directly in the market in the case 
of most PCG schemes – if credit assessment and monitoring is still left with the banks -, 
the past forty years have seen many examples of market-substituting policies to foster 
SME lending, with the result balance tipping heavily into the negative.  Such policies 
include directed credit, often combined with interest rate subsidies, and the establishment 
of development finance institutions focused on SME lending.  These policies share the 
                                                 
6 For an overview of the literature on PCGs, see World Bank (2007).   23 
problems of all government-managed financial sector programs – the trade-off between 
commercial and social goals results in high losses and non-sustainability of many of these 
programs.   Undercutting market conditions results in crowding out of private providers, 
even where the latter would be willing to enter due to changes in the general business 
environment or due to technological advances.   Political subversion of these programs 
often leads to corruption and channeling of funds to political cronies or to specific 
electoral groups (Cole, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005).   
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper surveyed empirical research on SMEs’ financing constraints and 
patterns.  A conceptual framework showed that transaction costs and asymmetric 
information between borrower and lender are the driving factors explaining the limited 
access to external finance by many SMEs in developing as well as developed economies.  
This conceptual framework allowed us to distinguish between market-developing policies 
such as reforming the contractual and informational framework, market-enabling policies 
such as fostering competition and providing regulatory frameworks for leasing and 
factoring and market-harnessing policies such as the financial safety net that prevent 
imprudent lending booms and busts. Government has an important role in reforming the 
institutional environment, providing regulatory frameworks and fostering competition.  
International experience, however, has shown the wide-spread failure of government-
owned or –managed financial institutions focusing on specific borrowers groups or 
directed lending programs.  Less clear is the role of government in intervening through 
activist policies, such as credit guarantee schemes.   24 
There is a broad research agenda going forward to better understand SMEs’ 
financing needs in developing and emerging economies.  First, it is important to better 
understand SME lending practices by financial institutions and identify best practices.  
Even more important, however, is it to understand how these practices depend on the 
business environment in which the financial institutions operate.  Efforts are under way 
using bank-level surveys and interviews (De la Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 
2007; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007).  Second, while we have focused 
mainly on the banking system – driven by the observation that banks still constitute the 
largest component of financial systems in the financial system of most developing and 
emerging markets – the role of non-bank financial institutions and financial markets, both 
on the debt and the equity side, has to be explored in more detail.  Third, the role of 
technology in expanding SMEs’ access to financial services has been little explored.  
While the introduction of credit scoring has been shown to expand SME lending in the 
U.S., it is not clear whether this technology can be easily applied to developing countries 
(Miller and Rojas, 2004).  By enabling more cost-effective consumer lending, 
technological advances such as credit scoring or alternative delivery channels such as 
electronic or mobile finance, might push lenders out of the SME lending market, thus 
even exacerbating SMEs’ financing constraints. Fourth, case studies on market-friendly 
activist government interventions have been undertaken, but a more rigorous impact 
evaluation is necessary, such as has been started for microfinance institutions (World 
Bank, 2007).  Finally, future research will also try to understand better the impact of the 
institutional structure, funding and pricing of partial credit guarantee schemes on SMEs’  25 
access to finance (Beck, Klapper and Mendoza, 2007).  Such research is necessary to 
inform policy makers about the costs and benefits of different interventions.  26 
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Figure 1: The Importance of SMEs across Countries  
This graph shows the share of employees in manufacturing across countries working in 











































































































































Figure 2.  Italy vs. U.K.: Firm Size at Entry and Over Time  
This graph shows the average value added for firms at entry and over time in Italy and 
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Figure 3: Growth obstacles reported by small and medium-size enterprises 
This graph shows the proportion of SMEs reporting different aspects of the business 
environment as major obstacle to their operation and growth.  Data are from the 






























































































































































































































































































































































































Fraction of small/medium firms reporting constraint as major/very severe
Source: Enterprise Surveys (The World Bank)
 
Figure 4: Financing patterns across firms of different sizes 
This graph shows the share of investment financed from internal finance and different 
external financing sources. Data are from the Investment Climate Surveys across 71, 
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Figure 5: Use of external financing sources across firms of different sizes 
This figure shows the share of large, medium and small firms that use different financing 
sources for new investment. Data are from the Investment Climate Surveys across 71, 

































































































































Figure 6: Growth effects of financing obstacles across firms of different sizes 
This graph shows the effect of different financing obstacles on firm growth for small and 
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Figure 7: Adverse selection, moral hazard 
and credit rationing
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